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Introduction
Both natural hazards management and social research 
into natural hazards are typically driven by ideas and 
debates about human life and property. How do we 
reduce their exposure, and increase their resilience, 
to inevitable and unpredictable hazard events? In this, 
policies and practices have been a significant focus, 
while the layers of practitioners and decision makers 
(or simply ‘practitioners’) who mediate between official 
policy, actual practice and scientific innovation have 
had relatively little attention. Frequently, in studies of 
the sector, individuals are conflated with an agency or 
sector and actual practices are conflated with policy 
guidelines. There are many possible explanations for 
this research gap, but the result is that insights into 
the crucial relationship between physical science, 
policy and practice within the sector generally emerge 
only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when 
we celebrate a technological breakthrough or in 
the aftermath of a disaster. The first situation can 
perpetuate the idea that using new scientific evidence, 
or transitioning to a new policy, is a smooth process. 
The second situation often leads to an emphasis on 
short-term culpability rather than the long-term 
causes (see Eburn & Dovers 2015). 
Two widespread misconceptions shape how we 
understand the relationships between policy, 
practitioners and physical science. The first is the 
‘pipeline model,’ which suggests there is a linear 
relationship between science and policy; one gives 
answers to the other’s questions (Jasanoff 2003). 
However, in reality, decisions about both research and 
policy priorities are social and political, rather than 
being deduced from empirical analysis. As political 
scientist Brian Head has suggested (2008, p.1), there 
are three forms of knowledge that lead to ‘evidence-
based policy’. These are systematic scientific research, 
program management experience, and political 
judgement. In short, empirical research (or ‘science’), 
regulations and practice are interdependent and 
contingent (Hunt & Shackley 1999). Having ‘policy-
relevant’ research or near-perfect predictions of 
future conditions will not make a significant difference 
where there are robust institutional limitations on the 
integration and use of new knowledge (Bosomworth 
2015, Howes et al. 2015). 
The second misconception is the assumed direct 
relationship between policy and actual practice. As 
researchers and practitioners know, this relationship 
is more often an elastic one, shaped by the capacities, 
affordances, and limitations of a given situation (Hickey 
et al. 2013). It is evident that policies are sometimes 
unachievable (whether due to resource shortfalls, 
shifting priorities, or other factors) and are often vague. 
Statutory objects stated in enabling legislation are 
typically very broad, allowing for further specification 
in subsidiary policy or regulations, and for flexibility in 
implementation and definition at the appropriate level 
of governance. What fire and emergency managers 
are meant to achieve is inevitably uncertain (Eburn & 
Dovers 2014), which allows judgement to be applied, 
but also leaves room for argument over the relative 
success or failure of practice. Additionally, history 
indicates that innovation in hazard management 
often requires practice to move ahead of policy, as 
practitioners test options better fitted to emergent 
ABSTRACT
Scientific knowledge and scientific 
uncertainties play a significant role in 
the mitigation of natural hazard risk. As 
such, the natural hazards sector is often 
represented as ‘science-led’ or ‘research-
led’. However, in actuality, relationships 
between scientific research, policy and 
practice are neither simple nor linear, and 
there are presently few studies that focus 
on the layers of practitioners who find 
themselves mediating these relationships. In 
order to provide insight into the integration 
of scientific knowledge, this paper considers 
the findings of a case study of bushfire 
practitioners in the Barwon-Otway area of 
southwest Victoria. This region has recently 
been the site of multi-agency efforts to 
reduce the residual bushfire risk using the 
PHOENIX RapidFire bushfire simulator. 
The paper concludes by posing several 
questions relevant to this and other risk 
mitigation contexts.
Science in Motion: integrating 
scientific knowledge into bushfire 
risk mitigation in southwest Victoria
Dr Timothy Neale and Dr Jessica K. Weir, Western Sydney University, and 
Professor Stephen Dovers, Australian National University, discuss the 
interface between science, policy and practice through a case study of 
bushfire risk mitigation. •
Australian Journal of Emergency Management I Volume 31, No. 2, April 2016
14
research and current circumstances. In such a 
context, personal and professional experience, and 
the local knowledge of members of the community, 
are all necessary supplements to official rules and 
available evidence.
So, though it is not uncommon to hear that good 
science provides good evidence for good policy, these 
‘good’ things are neither unambiguous in their qualities 
nor their sequence in actuality (Sarewitz 2004). 
Researchers, policy makers and practitioners all begin 
their work in medias res – or ‘in the middle of things’ 
– encountering an existing world of received wisdom, 
diverse incentives, and institutional cultures. For each, 
the parameters of enquiry and action may be beyond 
their control, strong evidence may not influence policy 
makers, or effective policy may face problems too 
urgent to wait on greater certainty. In fact, in devising 
and implementing strategies to reduce the probabilities 
and consequences of future events, risk mitigation is 
rife with uncertainties. In some cases their negotiation 
may present little obstacle, whereas in others the 
spectrum of ‘known unknowns’ may have to embraced 
rather than overcome (Neale & Weir 2015).
The recent history of bushfire risk mitigation in Victoria 
is an exemplar of the asynchronous rhythms of science, 
policy and practice, made possible by institutional 
and political factors outside the influence of any one 
agency or individual. Victoria is among the world’s 
worst regions for disastrous fires (Gill, Stephens & 
Carey 2013, p. 493), a fact that has elicited an evolving 
series of policy responses including, after the 2009 
Black Saturday fires, a commitment to treat five per 
cent of public lands with prescribed burning annually.1 
While implementing this policy, the Department 
of Environment, Land, Water & Planning (DELWP, 
formerly DEPI) has also piloted a new strategy to 
measure and plan bushfire risk mitigation using a two-
dimensional bushfire simulator (PHOENIX RapidFire, or 
‘PHOENIX’), building on a history of model development 
and science-policy interaction. The research project 
focused on one specific pilot region, the Barwon-Otway 
area of southwest Victoria to assess how new forms 
of scientific knowledge were being assimilated into 
mitigation policy and practice. This forms one of three 
case studies, developed to support practitioners to 
explain, justify and discuss risk mitigation practices 
to sector professionals, the public, the media, and 
others.2
Case study and method
The Barwon-Otway area consists of over one million 
hectares of high bushfire hazard area in southwest 
Victoria. In the past two decades, its eastern coast has 
increasingly become a destination for tourists. This 
significantly increases the population during the 
bushfire season along the forested coastal corridor 
1 With the endorsement of the Inspector-General for Emergency 
Management, the Victorian Government has moved to a version 
of the risk-based approach outlined in this paper.
2 For more on the project see: www.bnhcrc.com.au/research/
economics-policy-and-decision-making/232.
most exposed to high-intensity landscape fires between 
Torquay and Wye River.3 Since 2009, the area has been 
used by the DELWP, in collaboration with other 
agencies and local governments, as a pilot site to 
investigate a ‘risk-based’ alternative strategy to the 
established mitigation policy (DEPI 2014). To simplify 
significantly (see Ackland et al. 2014), the alternative 
involves simulations and comparisons. 
First is the generation of loss estimates from three 
suites of bushfires simulated within PHOENIX. Fires 
under ‘worst case’ (i.e. FFDI 130) weather conditions 
are simulated in landscapes in which there is:
• no history of planned or unplanned fire
• all public land has been burnt
• accidental fires and prescribed burning treatments 
have occurred. 
Given the model can predict house losses from fire 
intensity, the three suites can be compared to reveal 
the baseline risk, the benefit of mitigation, and the 
residual risk. A more complex arrangement, also 
trialled, compared multiple asset losses across 
multiple suites of scenarios. In the words of one expert 
review, these techniques represent ‘world’s best 
practice’ (Burrows et al. 2014) and provide a scientific 
method to both test and demonstrate the efficacy of 
forms of mitigation such as prescribed burning.
This case study was chosen in the anticipation that 
bushfire practitioners involved in this area would offer 
insights into the integration of science into policy and 
practice. To this end, 22 practitioners from the area 
were interviewed in November 2014 and October 2015. 
A brief summary is presented of their reflections on 
the integration of scientific knowledge and the primary 
uncertainties they encountered.
Integrating science
‘It’s the old saying, “all models are wrong but some of 
them are useful”’ Barwon-Otway practitioner.4
Social studies suggest that scientific models tend to be 
treated as ‘truth machines’ and as instigators, rather 
than participants in change. However, the practitioners 
in this study were cautious to identify both the limits 
and pitfalls of modelling and the many conditions that 
were necessary for its use. This meant, for example, 
being careful to describe the suites of simulations 
as ‘quite good’ or ‘better than useful,’ while also 
maintaining a clear enthusiasm to quantify risk; ‘before 
PHOENIX,’ as one said, ‘we had nothing to gauge the 
effectiveness or the efficiency of our planned burn 
program’. Consequently, the availability of spatial 
datasets was cited as a condition of possibility for 
the new strategies, including meteorological and fire 
behaviour data relating to historical exemplars and 
also data on flora and fauna distribution and other 
3 This paper and the research it draws on were completed prior 
to the Wye River fire in December 2015.
4 All quotes, unless otherwise noted, are from interviews with 
practitioners (not named).
Figure 1: Map of the Barwon-Otway area showing public lands managed by government agencies.
Source: Andrew Edwards
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inputs. The successful integration of the model, and 
the confidence expressed in it, were linked to separate 
initiatives across multiple agencies.
Perhaps just as important as the model was the 
construction of what several described as a ‘learning 
space’ within which planning could be developed. This 
involved three factors. First was the existence of both 
formal and informal links between multiple agencies, 
providing the mandate for collaboration and the social 
conditions for it to occur. While prior initiatives were 
cited as important (e.g. Integrated Fire Management 
Planning), specific personal relationships were also 
frequently mentioned. ‘If you have the rapport and 
the relationship, it works,’ as one noted. Second, 
practitioners identified the influence of personal links 
with researchers and research institutions developed 
over several years. As one stated, ‘it’s not automatic 
that scientists and policy makers and practitioners will 
communicate’. Third, the pilot involved community and 
sector stakeholders in knowledge exchange, including 
an advisory group convened in multiple workshops over 
18-24 months to provide feedback on model outputs. 
These three factors elicited a collaborative atmosphere 
in which ‘having a go’ was encouraged, to quote 
one, even if ‘the science isn’t perfect by any stretch 
of the imagination’. The alternative, it was openly 
acknowledged, was an approach in which ‘[we] would 
be just doing something and be guessing that it works’.
Institutional particularities within bushfire agencies 
were also reported as crucial to creating change. The 
most important was the leadership of senior managers 
and what some labelled a ‘generational change’. Such 
agencies are typically conservative institutions, in 
that the management of natural hazards can lead to 
conditions in which established policies and practices 
are preferred (Rayner, Lach & Ingram 2005). To ‘take 
the risk’ of making changes, one noted, ‘you’ve got to 
fight through some fairly strong headwinds’. In this 
instance, the position of multiple senior figures at 
both state and regional levels was seen as decisive, 
fostering interest in the model-based approach 
within agencies and among policy makers. The 
compliments to this were, on the one hand, individuals 
both inside and outside these agencies who were 
resistant and, on the other, ‘a new generation of fire 
managers willing to try stuff’. None of these groups 
were simply homogenous, as, for example, the ‘new 
generation’ had a variety of tertiary qualifications and 
expressed diverse opinions about prescribed burning, 
management priorities, resident responsibilities, and 
other important issues. Nonetheless, what they shared 
was an enthusiasm for the search for alternative ways 
of measuring and managing risk.
Managing uncertainties
Encountering and managing uncertainties is a key 
aspect of natural hazards management. In this 
instance, practitioners identified uncertainties which 
illustrated both the value and limits of modelling. One 
of the key purposes of the Barwon-Otway pilot was 
to investigate how assets and values beyond human 
life and property, such as flora and fauna, natural 
resources, and social values, could be incorporated 
into risk calculation. Unsurprisingly, while most 
practitioners indicated they were confident they 
understood risk to ‘a discrete element’ such as houses, 
where spatial data and causal relations were clear, 
discussions of other impacts brought up significant 
Figure 1: Map of the Barwon-Otway area showing public lands managed by government agencies.
Source: Andrew Edwards
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uncertainties. ‘The ecological stuff is, of course, a 
minefield of uncertainty,’ for example, due to deficits in 
understandings of surrogacy between species. Several 
practitioners indicated that ‘all [measures] are laden 
with assumptions and errors and biases,’ but testing 
and constructing such data was a necessary part 
of progress requiring significant ongoing effort and 
investment. Assets and values other than human life 
must be countable to ‘count’ in such contexts. As one 
practitioner concluded, ‘The key will be to be able to get 
[all] metrics right so that people can make informed 
decisions around what we’re doing’.
At the same time, ‘the unpredictability of how people 
will react and what they will do’ during bushfires 
is the most significant uncertainty they face. ‘The 
big unknown is people’ in both modelling and 
management, more generally. This is paradoxical, 
in that though human life is the central concern of 
policy makers and practitioners alike, in a ‘worst case’ 
bushfire ‘people will lose lives as a result of decisions 
that they made… [and less] as a result of activities that 
we did or didn’t do’. 
This is not to suggest practitioners did not think they 
could not affect the loss of human life, but that it is 
simultaneously the most important, least calculable, 
and least controllable variable in their work. As 
such, many practitioners identified how their own 
professional and local knowledge are necessary 
supplements, used to ‘ground truth’ modelling and 
inform decision-making. Several participants noted 
that, while agencies have historically been reluctant 
to release scientific assessments of risk, explicit 
modelling might help increase bushfire awareness. 
Such information is imperative to reducing risk to 
the public and, to a lesser extent, professional risk to 
themselves. The ethic, as one noted, should be ‘about 
being open and transparent with the public’.
The third key uncertainty relates to the context in which 
the capacities of science can be actualised. As 
practitioners stated, natural hazards risk management 
is necessarily a politicised field. It is shaped by a mix of 
policy settings, community expectations, and 
institutional cultures. Bushfire management, for 
example, is affected by both internal factors, such as 
institutional conservatism, and external factors, such 
as responses by policy makers and the public to 
climate change, research into the effects of smoke, 
government expenditure, and many other factors. 
Notably, practitioners identified the modelling 
strategies as, to quote one, ‘giving us something to 
stand on’ in this changeable context. Several pointed 
out that though the use of PHOENIX generated a wealth 
of new questions. It also gave new ways of speaking 
‘up’ convincingly to policy makers and ‘out’ to 
stakeholders.
Concluding questions
For the Barwon-Otway practitioners in this study, the 
transition to a risk mitigation strategy more attuned to 
current scientific research was neither driven solely 
by technology, nor was it inevitable. Its conditions of 
possibility were at once technical, cultural, political, 
and institutional, shaped by forces both for and against 
change. Overall, even participants who expressed 
contrasting views about the efficacy of prescribed 
burning described the transition very positively in its 
having provided a different basis for decision-making. 
As one stated, ‘[now] the effectiveness of the overall 
program can be based around something that’s a little 
bit more objective.’ Given the Victorian Government’s 
‘brave and positive’ commitment to expand the model-
based strategy in mid-2016 (Penman 2015), it is worth 
concluding with several questions about the use of 
scientific knowledge now raised by this work.
The purpose of making various assets and values 
measurable was to produce data concerning the benefit 
of agency efforts. Here was a method for estimating 
how many species will likely be negatively affected if 
there is no prescribed burning, for instance, or how 
many houses will likely be lost if a burning program is 
An area recently treated with prescribed burning at Moggs Creek, Surf Coast, Victoria.
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increased or reduced. Almost all practitioners identified 
the multiple practical benefits of such ‘objective’ 
measures to the planning and justification, though 
several also noted how such measures revealed the 
limits of government intervention as such. If, on the one 
hand, suites of simulations quantified the risk removed 
by agencies, it also, on the other, revealed the extent to 
which the risk in the landscape is beyond their efforts.
So, as the strategy is extended, how will explicit 
quantification reshape the distribution of 
responsibilities between agencies and communities? 
Notably, while the previous policy focused upon an area 
target, the risk-based approach contains no explicit 
benchmarks. The hope, several stated, was that the 
revelation of residual risk would ‘start a conversation’ 
about the distribution of responsibility.
The PHOENIX simulations are highly technical, 
generated using datasets and parameters whose 
selection and limitations are not easily explained. This 
complexity, combined with both the commitment of 
many practitioners to greater transparency, and the 
public interest in bushfire, raises two further questions. 
How much of the data generated in such scientific 
assessments should agencies release? How much 
effort should agencies devote to disseminating this 
information? While, as Eburn and Handmer argue 
(2012, p. 19), there ‘is no legal impediment to releasing 
reasonably accurate hazard information,’ there are 
clear disincentives to releasing information that may 
vary in its rigour, has the potential to harm at-risk 
communities financially, or reflects negatively on 
government departments. As bushfires and their 
socionatural and socioeconomic costs become more 
severe in fire-prone regions due to climate change 
(Hughes & Steffen 2013), these are likely to become key 
questions for everyone engaged in the interface 
between scientific research, policy and practice. 
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